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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
. STATE OF GEORGIA
AMANA I SA and
SHEIK MOHAMMED AL-AMOUDI
Plaintiffs,
v.

CAIRNWOOD GROUP, LLC,
CAIRNWOOD CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT, LLC, LANE P.
PENDLETON, LAIRD P. PENDLETON,
KIRK P. PENDLETON, and THAYER B.
PENDLETON.
Defendants,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Civil Action File No. 2006-CV-114931

FILED INO'FFi'CE

,

SEP 252009
~

_.

¥

FULTONcO~~O~

~

COURT

, A

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANTS' EXPERT ANDREW METRICK

On August 26, 2009, the parties appeared before this Court on Plaintiffs' motion
to exclude Defendants' expert Andrew Metrick. After reviewing the briefs of the parties,
Mr. Metrick's reports, the record in the case, and the arguments presented by counsel,
the Court finds as follows:
I.

Facts
This case arises out of Plaintiffs' investment in the Cairnwood Global Technology

Fund ("CGTF"), a fund created by the individual defendants, sponsored by Cairnwood
Group, LLC, and managed by Cairnwood Capital Management, LLC. Plaintiffs allege
that they were fraudulently induced to invest in CGTF. On April 13, 2009, Plaintiffs' filed
a Third Amended Complaint asserting counts for fraud, civil conspiracy to defraud,
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negligent misrepresentation and violation of the Georgia RICO Act. On June 22, 2009,
Plaintiffs filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Defendants' expert Andrew Metrick.

II.

The Daubert Standard
In 2005, the Georgia General Assembly adopted O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1, which

requires a trial court to apply the federal Daubert rule in assessing the admissibility of
expert testimony. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Therefore, federal authority, as well as Georgia law, is relevant to the question of
admissibility. See, Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., 283 Ga. 271 (2008).

Pursuant to

both O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 and Daubert, once a court determines that "scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact," an expert may give
opinion testimony so long as such testimony is reliable and relevant. O.C.G.A. §24-967.1; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-595 (1993). O.C.G.A § 24-9-67.1 defines reliable and
relevant testimony as testimony that is based upon sufficient facts or data, is the
product of reliable methods, and is the product of a reliable application of the methods
to the facts of the case.
The Daubert standard is liberal and favors admissibility.

See,~,

KSP

Investments, Inc. v. U.S., 2008 WL 182260 (N.D. OH 2008) ("As commentators have
noted, Rule 702 evinces a liberal approach regarding admissibility of expert testimony.
Under this liberal approach, expert testimony is presumptively admissible."); In re Scrap
Metal Antitrust Litigation, 527 F.3d 517, 530 (2008) ("[R]ejection of expert testimony is
the exception, rather than the rule.").
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The burden to establish admissibility falls upon the proffering party. Netguote,
Inc. v. Byrd, 2008WL 2442048, at *6 (D. Colo. 2008). In a Daubert inquiry, the trial
court acts as a "gatekeeper" in determining whether the expert is qualified to testify.
See,

III.

~,

CSX Transp., Inc. v. McDowell, 294 Ga. App. 871,872 (2008).

The Daubert Analysis
a. Qualifications of Mr. Metrick
Plaintiffs do not contest Mr. Metrick's qualifications to serve as an expert witness.

Rather, Plaintiffs seek to exclude Mr. Metrick's testimony on grounds that it is irrelevant
and unreliable. The Court finds that Mr. Metrick possesses proper qualifications to
allow him to serve as an expert witness on damages in this case.

b. Reliability and Relevance of Mr. Metrick's Opinion
Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Metrick's expert opinion should be excluded because it
rests on (1) incorrect legal conclusions and (2) insufficient facts and is, therefore,
unreliable and legally irrelevant.
First, Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Metrick used an incorrect measure of damages
based on an incorrect view of the proper standard of causation required in this case.
To the extent Mr. Metrick's testimony is based on a requirement that Plaintiffs show loss
causation-that Defendants alleged misrepresentations were the reason the investment
turned out to be a losing one-such testimony shall be excluded. In its Order on
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, the Court addressed at length the Parties'
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differing views of causation in this case, and rejected the argument that Plaintiffs can
only show proximate causation in one narrow way which is akin to the requirement of
"loss causation" under federal securities law.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Metrick's opinion is based on the incorrect
assumption that even if Plaintiffs did not invest in CGTF they would have invested in a
similar fund. The Court finds that this issue goes to weight rather than admissibility.
Plaintiffs raise significant challenges to the facts, assumptions, explanations, and
choices Mr. Metrick made in conducting his evaluation and rendering his expert opinion.
"Whether those explanations will withstand rigorous cross-examination, or challenges
based on alternative assumptions or data choices, is not the issue now before the
Court." In re Scrap metal Antitrust Litigation, 527 F.3d 517, 527 (2008) ("a
determination that proffered expert testimony is reliable does not indicate, in any way,
the correctness or truthfulness of such an opinion").

IV.

Conclusion
Plaintiffs' motion to exclude the expert testimony of Andrew Metrick is granted in

part and denied in part. Mr. Metrick's testimony regarding damages that must be
proven based on a "loss causation" standard has been rejected by the Court and, thus,
he may not opine based on that standard. However, all of Mr. Metrick's opinions that are
not based on a requirement that Plaintiffs establish "loss causation" shall be permitted
including Mr. Metrick's opinion as to (1) the proper offset amount, (2) a reduction in
damages based on a lack of justifiable reliance, (3) whether Plaintiffs damages are
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wholly attributable to Defendants alleged misconduct, etc.

50 ORDERED this 25th day of September, 2009.

A!(Lt.::o. ftc~
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
Copies to:
Attorneys for Plaintiffs:
David L. Balser, Esq.
Gregory S. Brow, Esq.
McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP
303 Peachtree ST. NE, Suite 5300
Atlanta, Georgia 30308
(404) 527-4170
(404 )527 -4198 (fax)
dbalser@mckennalong.com

Attorneys for Defendant Lane Pendleton
John Kenney, Esq.,
Hoguet, Newman, Regal & Kenney, LLP
10 E. 40th Street, 35th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Phone 212-689-8808
jkenney@hnrklaw.com
Attorneys for all remaining defendants:
Michael C. Russ, Esq.
Emily J. Culpepper, Esq.
David E. Meadows, Esq.
King & Spalding LLP
1180 Peachtree Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
(404) 572-4600
(404) 572-5100 (fax)
mruss@kslaw.com
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William T. Hangley, Esq.
Wendy 8eetlestone, Esq.
Paul W. Kaufman, Esq.
Hangley Aronchick Segal & Pudlin
One Logan Square, 27th Floor
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103
(215) 96-7033
(215) 568-0300 (fax)
wth@hangley.com
wbeetlestone@hangley.com

6

